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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Marco Antonio Jimenez appeals from the district court's orders denying 
his motion to grant public funds for the appointment of an expert to assist in his 
motion to suppress, and denying his suppression motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
On October 27, 2006, two men entered a Maverik convenience store in 
Rupert and robbed it, taking about $90 cash from the store clerk at gunpoint. 
(Presentence Report, pp.1-2.) Jimenez was subsequently arrested (R., pp.1 l -  
14), and charged in a criminal complaint with one count of robbery, and a penalty 
enhancement for using a firearm while committing that crime (R., pp.1-4). A 
preliminary hearing began on November 22, 2006, in which the testimony of 
several witnesses, including Minidoka Deputy Sheriff Joe Moore, was heard. (R., 
pp.27-29.) 
Deputy Moore testified that he was on patrol at night traveling east on 
Highway 25 about three miles west of Paul, Idaho, when he received a radio 
dispatch that a robbery had just occurred at the Rupert Maverik store. (R., p.73.) 
As he drove toward Rupert on Highway 25, he saw a vehicle traveling the 
opposite direction well below the speed limit (42 in a 55 zone) which caused him 
to be suspicious. (Id.) The deputy slowed down to 35 miles per hour so his 
vehicle would pass the other in an area lighted by a small gas station and 
convenience store named "Stimpy's." (Id.) When the suspect vehicle passed 
Deputy Moore in the lighted area, he saw four Hispanics in the car with bald 
heads, who reacted with "quite a bit" of surprise (i.e., wide eyes, open mouths) at 
seeing the deputy's vehicle. (R., p.74.) The deputy continued to watch the 
suspect car in his side mirror after the vehicles passed, and saw "a lot of furtive 
movements," including shifting around (but not changing seats) and moving by 
persons in both the front and back seats of the vehicle. (R., pp.74-75.) After he 
turned his patrol car around and followed the suspect vehicle, Deputy Moore saw 
more furtive movements, although not as exaggerated as he had seen in his side 
mirror. (Tr., p.75.) Finally, Deputy Moore noticed that the suspect vehicle 
"signaled for a longer distance than usual before turning into the right lane where 
the highway becomes a four lane highway near Paul," which indicated to the 
deputy that the driver was over-exaggerated in trying to do everything right. (Id.) 
Deputy Moore initiated a traffic stop of that vehicle. (Id.) 
At the end of that day's testimony, the trial court granted the state's motion 
to continue the preliminary hearing to enable the state to call other witnesses. 
(R., p.29.) When the hearing resumed several weeks later, Jimenez waived his 
right to a preliminary hearing. (R., pp.32-33.) The state filed an Information 
against Jimenez in district court, again charging him with robbery and the firearm 
enhancement. (R., pp.35-39.) Jimenez filed a motion for public funds to hire an 
expert witness to assist him in a suppression hearing by challenging Deputy 
Moore's ability to have observed enough to justify a stop of the vehicle Jimenez 
and three others rode in shortly after the robbery. (R., pp.44-56.) After a 
hearing, in which the district court and parties relied on the preliminary hearing 
testimony of Deputy Moore (319107 Tr., pp.14-29)' the court issued a 
memorandum decision denying Jimenez's request for public funds for an expert 
witness to assist him in a suppression hearing (R., pp.72-79). Jimenez also filed 
a motion to suppress (R., pp.62-65), which the district court denied after 
conducting a full hearing (R., pp.93-95; 4/16/07 Tr., pp.31-90). 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jimenez entered a conditional guilty plea to 
robbery, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his two motions. (R., pp.112- 
118.) The district court sentenced Jimenez to ten years fixed followed by an 
indeterminate term of fifteen years, for a unified sentence of twenty-five years; 
the court suspended that sentence and retained jurisdiction over Jimenez. (R., 
p.136-143.) Jimenez has filed a timely appeal from that judgment. (R., p.150- 
152, 161-166.) 
ISSUES 
Jimenez states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. 
Jimenez's request for funds to hire an expert to explain factors that 
would affect Deputy Moore's ability to perceive what he claimed he 
saw when Deputy Moore's purported observations were vital to the 
district court's denial of Mr. Jimenez's motion to suppress in 
violation of Mr. Jimenez's Fourteenth Amendment Right to due 
process? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Jimenez's motion 
to suppress as Deputy Moore's suspicion upon which he justified 
his warrantless stop was not objectively reasonable? 
(Appellant's brief, p.1 I .) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Jimenez failed to show error in the district court's denial of his request 
for funds to hire an expert to assist in his suppression hearing? 
2. Did the district court correctly apply the law to the facts of this case in 
denying Jimenez's motion to suppress? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Jimenez Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of 
His Reauest For Funds To Hire An Expert To Assist In His 
Suppression Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Jimenez claims he was entitled to public funds to hire an expert to assist 
him in his suppression hearing by providing "testimony about factors that would 
influence a person's ability to make the observations Deputy Moore claimed to 
make under the conditions upon which he claimed to make them." (Appellant's 
brief, p.12.) Review of the record and applicable law shows that Jimenez has 
established no error. 
B. Standard of Review 
The question of whether expert or investigative services should be 
provided by the state pursuant to I.C. 3 19-852 is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. State v. Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 395, 648 P.2d 203, 207 
(1982); State v. Kay, 108 ldaho 661, 668, 701 P.2d 281, 288 (Ct. App. 1985). 
"'[A] denial of a defendant's request for expert assistance or investigative 
assistance will not be disturbed absent a showing the trial court abused its 
discretion by rendering a decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by 
the circumstances of the case."' State v. Murphy, 133 ldaho 489, 492, 988 P.2d 
715, 718 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting OJn, 103 ldaho at 395, 648 P.2d at 207). 
C. Law Applicable To lndipent Defendants' Requests To Appoint An Expert 
At State Expense 
ldaho Code 5 19-852(a) provides: 
(a) A needy person who is . . . under formal charge of having 
committed . . . a serious crime, is entitled: 
(1) to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a 
person having his own counsel is so entitled; and 
(2) to be provided with the necessary services and facilities 
of representation (including investigation and other 
preparation). The attorney, services, and facilities and the 
court costs shall be provided at public expense to the extent 
that the person is, at the time the court determines need, 
unable to provide for their payment. 
Expert testing under I.C. 3 19-852 implicates a criminal defendant's fair 
trial rights because it affects his ability to present a defense. m, 103 ldaho at 
394, 648 P.2d at 206 (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971) 
("states must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the 
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for 
a price to other prisoners"), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (due 
process requires access to basic tools of an adequate defense)). "[Wlhat 
constitutes the basic tools or necessary services of an adequate defense has not 
been clearly defined, and may indeed vary from case to case." m, 103 ldaho 
at 394,648 P.2d at 206. As summarized by the ldaho Supreme Court: 
The constitution does not require a state to provide expert or 
investigative assistance merely because a defendant requests it. A 
defendant's request for expert or investigative services should be 
reviewed in light of all circumstances and be measured against the 
standard of "fundamental fairness" embodied in the due process 
clause. Before authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a 
particular purpose in an indigent's defense, the trial court must 
determine whether the funds are necessary in the interest of 
justice. 
State v. Lovelace, 140 ldaho 53, 65, 90 P.3d 278, 290 (2003) (citations omitted). 
D. Jimenez Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Denial Of His 
Request To Appoint An Expert At State Expense To Assist In His 
Suppression Hearinq 
After considering the preliminary hearing testimony of Deputy Moore, and 
the argument of the parties (319107 Tr., p.14, L.l - p.26, L.16), the district court 
issued a memorandum decision and order (R., pp.72-79) denying Jimenez's 
request for public funds to retain an expert to testify about whether Deputy Moore 
could have made the observations he testified about, given the speeds of the 
vehicles, and the lighting conditions in the area that night. Attached to this 
Respondent's brief as Appendix A is the district court's memorandum decision 
and order, which the state fully incorporates and relies upon, in part, for its 
response to Jimenez's appellate challenge to the district court's ruling. In 
addition to relying upon the district court's memorandum decision and order, the 
state makes the following supplemental arguments and comments. 
Jimenez argues that the district court decided his motion for funds for an 
expert witness under I.C. § 19-852(a) (provision of "necessary services") by 
relying on I.R.E. 702' (whether the offered testimony will "assist the trier of fact"), 
instead of the due process and equal protection standard provided in State v. 
m, 103 ldaho 391, 394, 648 P.2d 203, 206 (1982). See Appellant's brief, 
' I.R.E. 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
pp.14-17 ("The district court analyzed the claim in light of I.C. § 19-852 and ldaho 
Rule of Evidence 702 -- the rule authorizing the use of expert testimony;" 
I 
"Furthermore, the district court's reliance upon I.R.E. 702 in deciding the motion 
I for funds was inconsistent with the Olin standards.") 
However, the district court clearly understood the "fundamental fairness" 
and "due process" characteristics of Jimenez's request for funds for services, as 
it stated in its "applicable law" section: 
A defendant's request for expert or investigative services should be 
reviewed in light of all circumstances and be measured against the 
standard of "fundamental fairness" embedded in the due process 
clause. Before authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a 
particular purpose in an indigent's defense, the trial court must 
determine whether the funds are necessary in the interest of 
justice. 
I 
(R., p.76 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 ldaho 53, 65, 90 
1 
P.3d 278, 290 (2003))) Far from ignoring the standards set forth in m, the 
I 
I district court's recitation from Lovelace, as highlighted above, is taken from the 
same case Q~J relied upon and quoted in divulging its standard -- State v. 
Powers, 96 ldaho 833,838, 537 P.2d 1369,1374 (1975). S e e m ,  103 ldaho at 
395, 648 P.2d at 207 (quoting Powers); Lovelace, 140 ldaho at 65, P.3d at 290 
(same standard recited and attributed to Powers). 
Moreover, in its "analysis and decision" section, the district court made no 
mention of I.R.E. 702 (or even its "assist the trier of fact" standard) and reiterated 
at the end of its decision, "The court finds that denial of the services of an expert 
witness at this stage of the proceedings will not deny the defendant of the 
fundamental fairness required by the due process clause."' (R., p.78 (emphasis 
added).) In sum, Jimenez's suggestion that the district court employed the wrong 
standard is not well-taken.3 
Having (incorrectly) argued that the district court improperly based its 
decision on the I.R.E. 702 standard, Jimenez next claims the district court erred 
because Rule 702 cannot be used, inasmuch as "[tlhe rules of evidence are not 
applicable in determining preliminary questions of fact necessary to determine 
the admissibility of evidence when the district court is the trier of fact," citing 
I.R.E. 101(e)(l) and 104(a). (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Contrary to Jimenez's 
argument, even if the district court had based its decision to deny funds for an 
expert witness at Jimenez's suppression hearing solely on I.R.E. 702, such a 
ruling would not have run counter to I.R.E. 101 and 104 -- the admission of 
Deputy Moore's testimony (vis-a-vis the weight) was not predicated upon the 
expert witness's proffered testimony. 
The district court concluded that providing funds for an expert witness to 
assist Jimenez at his suppression hearing "is not necessary in the interest of 
justice," an obvious reference to the standard set forth in Lovelace. (R., p.78; 
see R., p.76.) The court explained: 
The closing speed of the vehicles can be readily determined 
arithmetically as can the time the deputy could have realistically 
observed the suspect's car. 77 miles per hour equals 112.9 feet 
' Although no reference was made to I.R.E. 702 in the district court's "analysis 
and decision" portion of its memorandum decision and order, it did quote that rule 
in its earlier "applicable law" section. (R., p.76.) 
it is unclear to the state how, as Jimenez seems to contend, the proffered 
testimony could fail to "assist the trier of fact" under I.R.E. 702, yet be considered 
"necessary services" under I.C. § 19-852. 
per second. The accuracy of the deputy's statements about what 
he observed at night while the vehicles were passing each other 
and then through his rearview mirror after the vehicles had passed 
can, if necessary to decide this case, be determined by the court 
without the assistance of an expert witness. It is the fact-finder's 
function to judge the credibility of witnesses. 
The district court found that the testimony of an expert to challenge the 
credibility of Deputy Moore's observations at the suppression hearing was not 
necessary. The speed and distance dynamics were already before the court (R., 
p.78; see 3/9/07 Tr., pp.16, 23-24), and the court was confident that it could 
gauge whether the officer's testimony about what he could see as the two 
vehicles passed was credible -- presumably by both its own common experience 
of viewing passing cars at nighttime in similarly lit conditions, as well as the 
perceived veracity of Deputy Moore's testimony. 
Considering the reasoning of the district court's memorandum decision 
and order (see Appendix A), and the above arguments and comments, Jimenez 
has failed to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
request for public funds to hire an expert to assist him at his suppression hearing. 
II. 
The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts Of This Case In 
Denvin~ Jimenez's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Jimenez was an occupant in a vehicle stopped in relation to a late-night 
armed robbery at the Rupert Maverik convenience store. After conducting a 
suppression hearing in which Deputy Moore testified at length, the trial court 
denied Jimenez's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the 
stop, determining that the stop was constitutionally reasonable. (4/16/07 Tr., 
p.84, L . l l  - p.90, L.8.) 
On appeal, Jimenez challenges the trial court's ruling, contending Deputy 
Moore's testimony fell short of establishing a reasonable suspicion to stop the 
vehicle Jimenez rode in. However, a review of Deputy Moore's testimony 
establishes that the district court correctly concluded the officer had reasonable 
suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. 
B. Standard of Review 
On review of a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court defers to 
the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. 
The district court's legal determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been met is subject to free review. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 916 
P.2d 1284 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C. The District Court Correctlv Applied The Law To The Facts In Concludinq 
Deputv Moore Had A Reasonable And Articulable Suspicion To Conduct A 
Traffic Stop Of The Vehicle Jimenez Occupied 
1. Applicable Law 
A police officer may, without violating constitutional rights, make an 
investigatory stop of an individual if that officer has a reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity is underway. Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880 
(1968). He may do so even though there is no probable cause to make an 
arrest. 4. Such a seizure must be justified by a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion on the part of the police officer that the person to be stopped has 
committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Rawlinas, 121 ldaho 930, 932, 
829 P.2d 520 (1992) (citing Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319 
(1972)). 
The "reasonable suspicion" standard is that the officer can articulate 
specific facts which, along with the reasonable inferences from those facts, justify 
the suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity. State v. Galleqos, 
120 ldaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1992); State v. Martinez, 129 ldaho 426, 
429, 925 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 1996). This standard is less demanding than 
the probable cause standard. Galleqos, 120 ldaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951; 
Martinez, 129 ldaho at 429, 925 P.2d at 1128. Whether the police officer had the 
requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop is determined on the basis of 
the totality of the circumstances. Rawlinas, 121 ldaho at 932 (citing United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 41 1, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981)). If the officer is reasonably 
mistaken about the facts when he detains a person, such mistake does not 
render the officer's suspicion unreasonable. See Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S. 
177, 185-86 (1990); State v. Buhler, 137 ldaho 685, 688, 52 P.3d 329, 332 (Ct. 
App. 2002); State v. McCarthy, 133 ldaho 119, 124, 982 P.2d 954, 959 (Ct. App. 
1999); State v. Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396, 401, 958 P.2d 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Where the stop is not based upon any observations made by the stopping 
officer but upon a message he receives from police dispatch, the appropriate 
inquiry is "whether the information given to the police, which underlay the 
dispatcher's message, included articulable facts supporting a reasonable 
suspicion that the occupant[s] of [the] vehicle [were] involved in criminal activity." 
State v. Sevy, 129 ldaho 613,615, 930 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Ct. App. 1997). 
2. Deputv Moore's Testimony 
In his suppression hearing testimony, Deputy Moore explained he had just 
finished eating when he received an "all-call" (dispatch to all deputies) about a 
robbery that had just occurred at the Maverik store in Rupert. (4116107 Tr., p.36, 
Ls. 14-23.) According to Deputy Moore, the dispatcher advised the robbery had 
been committed by two Hispanics with "hooded sweatshirts, bandannas, stocking 
caps, one had a dark-colored pistol . . . I think it was black is what they said." 
(4116107 Tr., p.37, L.19 - p.38, L.22.) He was about 8.6 miles away from that 
location, so he began driving his patrol vehicle toward Rupert, going east on 
Highway 25 with his overhead lights on. (4116107 Tr., p.37, Ls.4-6; p.39, Ls.8- 
12.) Deputy Moore traveled about a half-mile, then he turned off his overhead 
lights, and began checking vehicles as he passed them on the highway. (4116107 
Tr., p.39, L.22 - p.40, L.7.) After passing two or three vehicles, he noticed a 
vehicle that was traveling at 42 miles an hour in a 55 mile an hour zone, which 
drew his attention. (4116107 Tr., p.41, Ls.5-8.) In Deputy Moore's experience, 
going that far below the speed limit could typically be due to a driver being older, 
a driver being under the influence, or a driver attempting to avoid officers and 
lessen suspicion. (4116107 Tr., p.41, L.12 - p.42, L 20.) 
Deputy Moore testified that, given the time, distance and direction he 
traveled on Highway 25 after the robbery was reported to have occurred, and 
where he saw the suspect vehicle, placed that vehicle within the "window of 
possibility to have traveled from Rupert to that location." (4116107 Tr., p.41, L.21 
- p.43, L.24; p.47, L.25 - p.48, L.5; p.54, Ls.18-21.) In seeing the suspect vehicle 
coming toward him, Deputy Moore slowed his patrol vehicle down to 35 miles per 
hour so he would pass the other vehicle in the lighted area around Stimpy's 
convenience store and gas station. (4116107 Tr., p.44, Ls.10-21. R., p.73.) As 
the vehicles passed each other, Deputy Moore saw four individuals in the 
suspect vehicle, with bald heads, sitting in a low-ride position, which he 
described as riding low in the car, sitting with their shoulders level with the seats 
"where what you see mostly is the head." (4116107 Tr., p.46, Ls.4-11.) Deputy 
Moore later explained that the report of bandannas worn by Hispanic individuals 
committing a robbery might have indicated "some type of gang-type thing" that is 
also related to the culture of low-riding. (4116107 Tr., p.53, L.25 - p.54, L.8.) 
Deputy Moore testified that the persons in the suspect vehicle watched 
him as they went by with varying expressions, and that he was driving a 2004 
Ford Expedition that was marked as a sheriffs vehicle on the side and had 
overhead lights on its top. (4116107 Tr., p.46, L.16 - p.47, L.7.) Moore stated that 
he could see the occupants of the suspect vehicle before he passed them and 
was able to observe them for a second after he passed them. (4116107 Tr., p.47, 
Ls.21-24.) As he was passing the vehicle, "all four seemed to look at [Deputy 
Moore] and had varying expressions." (4116107 Tr., p.47, Ls.14-17.) Deputy 
Moore continued to slow down, and as soon as the suspect vehicle passed he 
looked in his side mirror and saw "quite a bit of movement, turning around, 
looking . . . blust bouncing around inside," which was unusual. (4116107 Tr., p.48, 
Ls.13-22.) When asked to describe the "furtive" movements he observed, 
Deputy Moore explained: 
When I looked into my mirror I could see subjects turning 
around and looking at me, subjects turning and talking to each 
other in a rushed manner, and that's when I decided, okay, I'm 
going to turn around and check this out. 
Q. And that observation happened as you were passing them at 
Stimpy's? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did that observation continue as you followed them? 
A. Once I caught up to them, which was about Fifth Street or 
SO. 
Q. And why was that furtive movement significant, based on 
your training and experience? 
A. I don't normalty experience that on a vehicle that I turn on. 
Q. People don't tend to get excited and start - - 
A. Jumping around or moving around in a car really fast, no, sir. 
Q. What does that suggest to you? 
A. Quite possibly there might be some reason for it, such as to 
remove clothing, hide weapons, secure items that they don't want 
to be found. 
Q. With respect to the Hispanic individuals, you also were able 
to observe that as you passed them at Stimpy's? 
A. I did. 
Q. Was that significant based on the call you'd received? 
A. It was significant that -- it was a fact that I felt like I needed to 
check out. 
(4116108 Tr., p.55, L.7 - p.56, L.'l2.) 
Deputy Moore noticed that the suspect vehicle did something unusual by 
following the law to an unusual extent in signaling a right-hand lane change prior 
to where the highway divides from one lane into two as it enters the City of Paul. 
(4116107 Tr., p.49, L . l l  - p.52, L.18.) He explained that, in his experience, 
people who speed sometimes turn their blinker on way before they get to their 
turn, as do people who have been drinking. (4116107 Tr., p.53, Ls.2-6.) 
3. The District Court's Decision 
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district court announced 
its decision, and explained: 
So when you look at this thing in the totality of all the 
circumstances I come back to a couple questions, and admittedly 
this is a close case. One is, police officers are paid to be 
suspicious. Let's start with that general proposition that that's part 
of what the job is. Two, this officer was on a heightened suspicion 
because there had within minutes prior been an armed robbery at 
the Maverick [sic]. Three, it's in the middle of the night: It's one 
o'clock or thereabouts in the middle of the night. He starts towards 
the scene of the robbery, initially passed two cars that did not raise 
any suspicions, but in the context of things there's kind of a lack of 
suspicion. The officer testified he saw three cars total and it was 
the third car that he encountered that drew his attention, and the 
attention was drawn because it was about the amount of time it 
would take for a vehicle to drive to the location it was at from the 
scene of the crime. 
Two, the speed of the vehicle, 13 miles an hour below the 
normal traffic pattern or speed limits. And I understand that the 
temptation here is to look at any one of the individual facts and say: 
Is that enough? No. Is there anything wrong with driving below the 
speed limit? That in and of itself, by itself? Well, it depends on the 
circumstances: Frequently not. If the driver goes below the speed 
limit for the greater good, then of course it's wrong. 
Back to the question where the officer testified that it was 
about two hundred feet and he observed four occupants in the 
vehicle. The suspects that were identified on the all-call, the radio 
transmission business, were two in number, this officer saw four. 
Then this officer saw all four turn and look at him as he went by at 
this relatively slow speed; and then according to this officer these 
individuals acted particularly nervous, like moving in excitement, so 
then the officer turned around and saw what could be described as 
a premature turning on of the blinker in some fashion, which again 
still further heightened his suspicions. 
So the officer, in his training and experience, when he 
noticed the scene -- first of all you've got a vehicle that proximity- 
wise and time-wise could be the vehicle. Now [defense counsel] 
points out: How do you know which way they went? Well, they 
didn't know. All they knew was this robbery occurred and that the 
guy left on foot and subsequently this officer saw interesting 
conduct in a vehicle that drew his attention. 
So based upon a totality of those circumstances, all of those 
listed by the officer which I'll adopt herein by reference, at this point 
I'll deny the motion to suppress, although I will again say that it's 
razor thin. But I draw on this Gascon case because it's really 
parallel, in my mind, to the facts that are stated and the reasonings 
stated . . . . 
(4/16/08 Tr., p.86, L.25 - p.89, L.19.) 
4. The District Court Correctlv Concluded Deputv Moore's Testimony 
Established A Reasonable And Articulable Suspicion To Justify The 
Traffic Stop 
The district court's rendition of some of Deputy Moore's specific testimony, 
as well as all the other circumstances listed in Deputy Moore's testimony, which 
the court adopted by reference, provides the following summary of factors 
justifying Deputy Moore's traffic stop: 
(1) Proximity: given its location and time when spotted by the deputy, the 
suspect vehicle was within the "window of possibility to have traveled from 
Rupert to that location." (4116107 Tr., p.41, L.21 - p.43, L.24; p.47, L.25 - 
p.48, L.5; p.54, Ls.18-21.) 
(2) Unusuallv slow driving: the significantly slower speed than the posted 
speed limit (i.e., 13 miles per hour less) was, in the deputy's experience, a 
possible indicator that the driver was attempting to avoid police scrutiny. 
(4116107 Tr., p.41, L.5 - p.42, L.20.) 
(3) Suspect's description: the observation that the vehicle had four 
Hispanic men inside was consistent, in regard to race, with the description 
of the two men who robbed the Maverik store. (4116107 Tr., p.53, Ls.20- 
24; p.56, Ls.5-12.) 
(4) Keen interest in deputv's presence: as he passed the other vehicle, 
Deputy Moore noticed all four occupants in the vehicle were watching him 
with "varying expressions," and "showed a keen interest" in him as an 
officer. (4116107 Tr., p.46, Ls.20-24; p.47, Ls.14-16; p.53, Ls. 20-21; p.55, 
Ls. 1-4.) 
(5) Detailed description of "furtive" movements: after he passed the other 
vehicle, Deputy Moore described the actions of the four men variously: (a) 
"quite a bit of movement, turning around, looking . . . n]ust bouncing 
around inside," (b) "subjects turning around and looking at me, subjects 
turning and talking to each other in a rushed manner," and (c) "[i]umping 
around or moving around in a car really fast." According to the deputy, 
such conduct suggested the occupants might be removing clothing, hiding 
weapons, or securing items they did not want found. (4116107 Tr., p.48, 
Ls.13-22; p.55, L.7 - p.56, L.4.) 
(6) Unusual use of lane change signal: although admittedly legal, Deputy 
Moore nonetheless took note that the suspect vehicle engaged in what, in 
his experience, was unusual conduct by signaling a right hand lane 
change before Highway 25 split from one to two lanes as it entered the 
City of Paul. (4116107 Tr., p.49, L.8 - p.52, L.18; p.54, Ls.11-15.) 
(7) Possible gana-connection: Deputy Moore noted a possible gang 
connection between the description given of the two robbers and the "low- 
riding" conduct he observed by the occupants of the suspect vehicle: the 
report of bandannas worn by the Hispanic individuals committing a 
robbery "could -- or to me might have been some type of gang-type thing. 
That's also in this area part of the culture of low riding." (4116107 Tr., p.53, 
L.24 - p.54, L.2.) 
Considering the totality of the above-listed circumstances outlined by 
Deputy Moore's testimony, the district court was correct to conclude that the 
officer articulated a reasonable suspicion to justify his traffic stop of the vehicle 
Jimenez occupied. In reaching its decision, the district court concluded the 
principles of search and seizure law applied in State v. Gascon, 119 Idaho 932, 
812 P.2d 239 (1991), have similar application to Jimenez's case 
In Gascon, police officers received a radio dispatch notifying them of a 
bank robbery and describing the bank robber. Id. at 933, 812 P.2d at 240. "No 
description of a getaway car was provided, and no one knew for sure whether the 
robber did in fact enter a vehicle on leaving the bank." Id. Based upon this 
information, the police established a vantage point along one of the likely routes 
the robber would take from the scene of the robbery. Id. The officers put out 
cones diverting all traffic into one lane, requiring it to slow near a bridge that had 
to be crossed if the robber wished to access the freeway. Id. Officers then 
observed the cars and their drivers, looking for people that matched the 
description of the robber. Id. As Gascon drove past, he twice reached under the 
passenger seat. Id. The officers stopped him and seized items partly visible 
under the seat. Id. 
On appeal from the denial of his suppression motion, Gascon argued that 
the stop of his car was illegal because the officers were not "able to match their 
description of the suspect with the driver of the vehicle." 4. at 934, 812 P.2d at 
241. The ldaho Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, stating that the 
police were in a place where a robber was likely to flee and that Gascon's actions 
of leaning over, once disappearing from view, "were aptly characterized as 
suspicious and gave rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Gascon 
could have been involved in the robbery." Id. 
A review of the record in this case shows that the district court correctly 
found, under the totality of circumstances, that Deputy Moore had reasonable 
suspicion justifying the stop of the vehicle in which Jimenez was an occupant. 
As in Gascon, Deputy Moore saw the vehicle in a location that was consistent 
with the time it would have taken to travel from the Rupert Maverik store after the 
r ~ b b e r y . ~  Jimenez attempts to reduce Deputy Moore's specific description of the 
four men's "furtive movements" as simply saying they appeared "nervous," thus 
setting up a straw man (i.e., mere "nervousness" during a police encounter) to 
knock over. See Appellant's brief, p.22 ("Presumably, Deputy Moore found that 
the passengers were nervous because they saw he was a cop. However, as the 
ldaho Court of Appeals has found . . . ."), p.27 ("the passengers were nervous 
and communicating with each other when they saw him"); see also Hernandez v. 
m, 132 ldaho 352, 358, 972 P.2d 730, 736 (Ct. App. 1998) (special 
Although the robbery suspects could have taken a different road in Jimenez's 
case, the same was true in Gascon, where the court of appeals noted that the 
police had set up a vantage point along one of the likely routes the robber would 
take from the scene of the robbery. Gascon, 119 ldaho at 933,812 P.2d at 240. 
concurrence, Schwartzman, J.) ("Nor does some vague reference to a so-called 
"furtive movement" elevate the relatively innocuous and innocent behavior . . . 
into the realm of "reasonable suspicion.") 
However, Deputy Moore's testimony did not describe mere "nervousness" 
or vaguely relate he had seen "furtive" movements by the occupants in the 
vehicle. See Appellant's brief, p.25 (contrasting Gascon to Jimenez's case, 
stating "the officers [in Gasconl did not rely upon simply calling the driver's 
movements 'furtive;"'). Deputy Moore's specific testimony bears repeating on 
this point: he saw "quite a bit of movement, turning around, looking . . . [jlust 
bouncing around inside," "subjects turning around and looking at me, subjects 
turning and talking to each other in a rushed manner," and "[jjumping around or 
moving around in a car really fast," which conduct suggested the occupants 
might be removing clothing, hiding weapons, or securing items they did not want 
found. (4116107 Tr., p.48, Ls.13-22; p.55, 1.7 - p.56, L.4.) Deputy Moore's 
testimony clearly described a scene of panicked scrambling action on the part of 
the four men inside the vehicle. To characterize such actions as normal 
"nervousness" occurring during a police encounter strains credulity -- especially 
since there was no face-to-face encounferwith the deputy, or even an attempt to 
stop the vehicle, at that point in time. See State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285- 
86, 108 P.3d 424, 432-33 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Because it is common for people to 
exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement regardless of 
criminal activity, a person's nervous demeanor during such an encounter is of 
limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion.") 
Jimenez also argues that State v. McAfee, 116 ldaho 1007, 783 P.2d 874 
(Ct. App. 1989), is similar to his case, and shows that Deputy Moore's traffic stop 
was based only on a "hunch" of criminal activity. (Appellant's brief, pp.26-27.) 
However, McAfee is inapposite. The police officer in that case had no 
information other than the innocuous driving (prolonged stop at a stop sign) of 
the defendant at night in a high crime area upon which to form a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity to justify a traffic stop. The court of appeals in 
McAfee did not specifically reject as factors for determining the reasonableness 
of an investigatory stop the fact that McAfee lawfully hesitated at the stop light for 
a longer period than usual and the fact that he was driving late at night. Rather, 
the court held that these factors alone were not sufficient to constitute 
"reasonable and articulable suspicion" to believe that McAfee was engaged in 
illegal conduct. McAfee, 116 ldaho at 1009, 783 P.2d at 876. The court appeals 
focused on the idea that, "Iflor an investigatory stop to be reasonable, it must be 
accompanied 'by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is 
about to be, engaged in criminal activity."' id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 
449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 (1981) reh'g denied 455 U.S. 1008, 102 
S.Ct. 1648 (1982)) The McAfee decision further explained: 
However, McAfee did not drive erratically, nor was he 
slumped over the steering wheel. He parked, shut off the lights and 
engine, laid across the passenger seat and fell asleep. The 
magistrate found that the officers had not received any reports that 
may have aroused their suspicion of McAfee or his van. Nor was 
there testimony that the police were looking for a particular 
individual or vehicle wanted in connection with other criminal 
activities. The officers were simply suspicious because the van had 
stopped. McAfee was legally parked in a place where he had a right 
to be. Apparently no traffic laws or other law had been violated. 
Therefore, upon examining the "whole picture" of McAfee's 
situation, we conclude that there was no reasonable articulable 
suspicion that could form the basis of a lawful seizure. 
Id. In contrast to the main concern of the court of appeals in McAfee, that no 
-
crime was reasonably suspected to have even occurred, here, Deputy Moore 
responded to a contemporaneous report of a convenience store robbery. He did 
not conduct the traffic stop merely because he had an undifferentiated "hunch" 
that a crime may have occurred -- he knew one had. 
Unlike McAfee, the facts surrounding Deputy Moore's traffic stop, viewed 
together, provided the deputy with a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify 
the stop. The record shows Deputy Moore saw the vehicle in a location which it 
might have been following the robbery, that vehicle was traveling well below the 
speed limit, the occupants of the vehicle were the same race as those who 
committed the robbery, the suspects took great notice of Deputy Moore's 
presence as they began to pass his patrol vehicle, and after passing, they were 
moving or jumping around in the car really fast, as if they were concealing 
something. Additionally, although perhaps of less significance, the deputy 
noticed that the suspect vehicle turned its blinker on before Highway 25 split into 
two lanes, which was unusual (even though lawful), and there was some hint of 
gang-related behavior by both the reported robbery suspects (wearing of 
bandannas) and the occupants of the suspect vehicle (low-riding). 
Based on all of the factors enunciated by Deputy Moore, the district court 
correctly concluded he had a reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the 
vehicle. Jimenez has failed to show error in the district court's determination that 
the stop of the vehicle was constitutionally reasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the judgment entered upon Jimenez's 
conditional guilty plea to one count of robbery be affirmed. 
DATED this 2oth day of November 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 20th day of November 2008, served 
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
JASON C. PINTLER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
APPENDIX A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
MARC0 A. JIMENEZ and RAMIRO 
REYES NEVAREZ, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CR-2006-3945 
CR-2006-3948 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
ON APPORTIONMENT OF FUNDS FOR 
EXPERT WITNESS 
The above captioned cases have been consolidated solely for the purpose of hearing the 
defendants' Motions to Suppress. In connection with the Motions to Suppress, the defendants 
have requested funds for an expert witness. A hearing on the defendants' Motion for 
Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness was held on March 9, 2007 in open court. Mr. 
Marco Jimenez was represented by Mr. Kent D. Jensen. Mr. Ramiro Reyes Nevarez was 
represented by Mr. Clayne S. Zollinger. The state was represented by Mr. Jason D. Walker, 
Minidoka County Prosecuting Attorney. The court heard argument on the motion and the matter 
was submitted for decision. The court now enters the following: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. Facts. 
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The alleged facts, so far as relevant to this decision are as follows:' 
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on October 27,2006, two men committed an armed 
robbery at the Maverick convenience store in Rupert, Idaho. They wore bandanas, hats 
and gloves so the store clerk could only observe the area around their eyes. After the 
robbery the clerk immediately called the police. At about the same time, Sheriffs Deputy 
Joe Moore was on patrol about three miles west of Paul Idaho traveling east on Highway 
25. Deputy Moore received a radio message that there had been an armed robbery at the 
Maverick store in Rupert. He tumed on his emergency lights and began to speed up 
intending to go the scene of the robbery but then decided that because the robbery had 
occurred minutes before and he was driving towards Rupert he might encounter the 
suspects traveling in the opposite direction if they chose to leave Rupert by that route. He 
then tumed off his emergency lights and proceeded east on Highway 25. As he was 
traveling through Paul, he saw a westbound car approaching. He saw no other cars on the 
highway. Using his radar, the deputy determined that the approaching car was traveling 
42 MPH in a 55 MPH zone. The deputy stated that this low speed made him suspicious 
because people usually drive at approximately or a little above the speed limit and that 
they do not often drive 10 MPH or more below the speed limit without a reason. He 
believed that if someone had committed the robbery in Rupert they would either be 
leaving the area at a slow speed so as not to draw attention or a high rate of speed. The 
deputy then adjusted his own speed so that he would pass the oncoming vehicle near 
Stimpy's, a small gas station and convenience store east of Paul. The deputy testified that 
he wanted to pass the vehicle in that area because there were lights at Stimpy's and he 
could better observe the car and occupants. The deputy slowed to 35 MPH and the other 
I The facts are summarized from the transcript of Mr. Jimenez's prelirninazy hearing held on November 22, 2006, 
pp. 51-95. 
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car continued to approach at 42 MPH. The deputy testified that as the cars passed he 
observed four Hispanic individuals in the car and he noticed bald heads. The deputy then 
testified as follows: 
Q: After your patrol vehicle passed this vehicle, what did you do? 
A: I left my rear lights off and started to slow down and looked in my rearview 
minor-side mirror and observed-in fact when I drove by once I was made, 
once I was observed to be a police vehicle I got quite a bit of reaction from inside. 
Q: And could you describe this reaction? 
A: Well, initially it was merely just a-I don't know any other way to say it than 
like goodness or exclamation. 
Q: And how did--can you describe why you perceived that? 
A: I-because of wide eyes, open mouth, or- 
Q: From the individuals in the car? 
A: Yes, ma'am. 
Q: Okay. Other than that type of, I guess, surprise look on a face, what else do 
you recall? 
A: At that point, that was it. That and I saw some bald heads which the light 
enhanced, which made me aware of it, which has no bearing 1 guess, but that's 
what I observed. I slowed, looked in my minor, saw a lot of furtive movements. 
Q: And what do you mean by that? 
A: Shifiing around, moving. I didn't actually see anybody change seats, not that 
deal, but within the two going in the back together and one in the front moving 
around like that, so at that point is when I decided to turn on the vehicle and 
investigate it further. 
Q: What did that type of hrtive movement if anything, mean to you? 
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A: Well, in some cases you can-you can hide things, you can get things. You 
can be reaching for a weapon. You can be storing a weapon, just none of it good 
that I, you know, when you have that reaction at that time of night when you're 
observed to be just a police vehicle, most people don't react like that. You have a 
lot of kids that turn around and look, but that's different to turn around and Look. 
Nobody turned around and looked. 
Q: At you that night? 
A: Not after I passed them because I watched-it was a few feet, probably 60, 70 
feet before my mirror picks up the image, you know, there's that much. They 
could have I guess, but it was mostly just turn to the side when I passed and then 
when I went back, I looked, they were moving around. 
Q: So is it fair to say that-that the reaction that you observed and the four 
individuals in the car that night was unusual based on your experience in law 
enforcement? 
A: Extremely unusual and very suspicious. 
Q: And upon observing that what did you do? 
The deputy testified that he turned around and followed the suspect vehicle and he 
observed "some furtive movement-not quite as exaggerated as through the mirror." He also 
observed that the vehicle signaled for a longer distance than usual before turning into the right 
lane where the highway becomes a four lane highway near Paul. The deputy thought that was 
unusual and indicated that the driver was trying to do everything right and "over-exaggerated." 
The deputy then initiated a traffic stop. On cross examination the deputy admitted that the 
closing speed of the vehicles as they passed was over 70 MPH and that he did not observe the 
suspect vehicle violate any laws prior to the stop. 
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The defendants have filed motions to suppress evidence, asserting that the stop of the 
vehicle was not supported by probable cause. In connection with their motions to suppress, they 
have requested funds for an expert witness pursuant to I.C. 519-852. It is undisputed that both 
defendants are indigent. 
2. Applicable Law. 
I.C. $19-852 provides, in part, that an indigent defendant is entitled "to be provided with 
the necessary services and facilities of representation (including investigation and other 
preparation)" at public expense. Our Supreme Court has explained the statute as follows: 
The constitution does not require a state to provide expert or investigative 
assistance merely because a defendant requests it. A defendant's request for 
expert or investigative services should be reviewed in light of all circumstances 
and be measured against the standard of "fundamental fairness" embedded in the 
due process clause. Before authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a 
particular purpose in an indigent's defense, the trial court must determine whether 
the funds are necessary in the interest of justice. Such a review necessarily 
involves the exercise of the sound discretion of the trial court, and a denial of a 
request for investigative assistance will not be disturbed absent a showing that the 
trial c o w  abused its discretion by rendering a decision which is clearly erroneous 
and unsupported by the circumstances of the case. 
State 1,. Lovelace, 140 Idahc 53,65,90 P.3d 278,290 (2003). 
I.R.E. 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as a 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of opinion or otherwise. 
3. Analysis and Decision. 
It is well settled that a traffic stop is a seizure of a person and that it implicates Fourfh 
Amendment safeguards. Our Court of Appeals has held: 
The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures 
applies to the seizures of persons through arrests or detentions falling short of 
arrest. The stop of a vehicle is a seizure of its occupants and is therefore subject to 
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Fourth Amendment standards. When the purpose of the detention is to investigate 
a possible traffic offense or other crime, it must be based upon reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Because the stop of a vehicle and 
detention of its driver is generally a detention of any passengers as well, 
passengers have standing to contest the reasonableness of the detention. 
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct.App. 2002) (Internal citations 
omitted). Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is determined upon a 
totality of the circumstances. State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 43 1, 146 P.3d 697 (Ct.App. 2006). Once 
it is shown that a warrantless seizure has occurred, the state has the burden of showing that the 
seizure was within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. 
Here, according to the preliminary hearing transcript, the facts known to the deputy prior 
to the stop were:' 
1 .  An armed robbery had occurred a few minutes earlier in Rupert. 
2. The deputy was driving towards Rupert on one of the routes the suspects could have 
used if they were leaving Rupert. 
3. The suspect vehicle was traveling slower than the posted speed limit. 
4. The deputy allegedly observed furtive movements by the vehicle's occupants as he 
passed them and then through his rearview mirror. 
5. The driver of the suspect vehicle signaled for a longer distance than usual before 
turning. 
The defendants seek funds for an expert witness who will provide testimony about the closing 
speed of the two vehicles, the short time the deputy would have had to observe the occupants of 
The court recognizes that additional facts may have been known to the deputy but not disclosed at the preliminary 
hearing. 
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the car, and, presumably, whether the deputy could actually have observed what he said he 
observed. 
The closing speed of the vehicles can be readily determined arithmetically as can the time 
the deputy could have realistically observed the suspect's car. 77 miles per hour equals 112.9 
feet per second. The accuracy of the deputy's statements about what he observed at night while 
the vehicles were passing each other and then through his rearview mirror after the vehicles had 
passed can, if necessary to decide this case, be determined by the court without the assistance of 
an expert witness. It is the fact-finder's function to judge the credibility of witnesses. C '  State v. 
Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 81 P.3d 1220 (2003) (Polygraph evidence inadmissible--expert's opinion 
admissible up to the point where opinion would require expert to pass on credibility of witness). 
The court finds that denial of the services of an expert witness at this stage of the proceedings 
will not deny the defendant of the fundamental fairness required by the due process clause. 
Therefore, an expenditure of funds for that purpose is not necessary in the interest of justice. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants' Motion for 
Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness is DENIED. 
Dated March 22,2007 
hdn Melanson, District Judge 
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